Canon Chapter 11
Respond to question # 3 at the end of the chapter, using your insights from Lathem, Rauch, and your main text.
posted by Mr. K @ 9:18 AM
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Walker Political Science Discussion
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The interest group system as portrayed by Rauch seems to look at solely the negative aspects of the system. According to him, interest groups slow down the policy making system to levels that it does not work. He says, everyone is for taking the government back from “them” and giving it to “the people”, but what “the people” do not realize is, they are actually in the interest groups themselves. When people always blame others and find no fault of their own, it poses a dangerous situation in which democracy is threatened. The government of the people is actually in the hands of people when they do not realize it. However, on the other side one must look at advantages of slowing down the policy-making process. The Framers wanted a complex process that resulted in a lengthy ordeal to pass new legislation. This should help ensure that new, oppressive laws that took away freedoms were not able to be passed. While the founding fathers did want a complex system for making laws, the current system with all of the interest groups may have gone way past what they envisioned. Having answered yes to both parts of the question, there arises a conflict that the answers do not seem compatible. Although, I think answering yes to both questions is indeed possible. Rauch points out the dangers of how many interest groups there are today and that they may indeed be slowing down the policy making process to a dangerous point. But also the founding fathers wanted the process slowed down, we just cannot know how slowly they wanted the law making process to go. As long as one assumes that the Framers were more concerned with protecting the general rights of people rather than having a well-oiled democracy, then we can assume “yes” to both questions.
Rauch speaks of interest group politics rendering ineffective to democracy, and I will qualify with this point of view. Certainly, the people definitely want themselves to be represented and "blame others" as Jarrod says, which I agree would be hazardous to democracy. The interest group politics we have serves a purpose I have found after reading the textbook. The interest group system provides a platform to elevate ideas to the presidential or DC level, if you will. I think that, although there is misrepresentation in our system, that at least we have the ability to foster change (wow...buzz words. And as far as the framers are concerned, I think that they knew what they were doing for sure. I say this because the system they provided has at least held up for the 200 years we have as a nation. The framers knew that rules took time to be passed, and they deliberatley made the system to work that way. The lengthy process has definitely changed over the years with the swarm of interest groups, but the principle remains the same. You could easily qualify witht these statements and there would be no issue. The interest group system, though flawed, still operates well.
Rauch exerts that interest groups are a danger to democracy because they pull Washington in many different directions and invest to ensure the benefits of their group. I agree that many interest groups do muddle up democracy by employing politicians to support their spcific interests and attempting to tie their hands from on acting in an unfavorable way. The interest groups do represent specific people and provide them a voice but they are collection of highly motivated people that have much more vested interest to acheive favorable legislation than the general public; consequently, we allow for interest groups to lobby for policies that cost the majority of people but their benefits of it are much greater. It stands to say then that some interests groups promote minority benefits at the cost of the public--taxes to provide subsidies. I believe that the Framers intentions of slow action through the government is achieved through interest groups, however, not the way they envisioned it or the way they envisioned people benefiting from it.
Rauch’s arguments for why interest groups hinder the success of government are most compelling. He offers a substantial amount of evidence to back up his claims which leads me to agree with him. The large number of interest groups has slowed down the rate at which the government functions to the point where democracy is in danger. I, for one, am concerned at how the complication of dealing with various organizations does not allow legislation to be created effectively in a reasonable amount of time. With so many viewpoints spread across such a wide spectrum, it is difficult to focus on a problem and solve it successfully. I find Rauch’s suggestions of cutting the lobbies monetary supports to be brilliant. It drops the persuasive power of the interest groups below that of the legislature and also forces them to compete more fiercely for support. When the constitution was designed, devices were put into place to allow legislation to take a long amount of time to pass in order for it to be completely analyzed and agreed upon. These devices continue to function today, but the hyperpluralistic effect of interest groups has further slowed down the process. The official limitations in the constitution and the results of interest groups have compounded in a way that government is slowed down too much. Thus this system is not implementing the principals of the constitution but is instead accentuating the mechanisms in the constitution to the point where they no longer serve their original purpose. An answer of yes to the third question would result in a problem because the framers ideas would result in dangers for democracy. I, however, do not think it was the framers who planned for the current state of interest groups, and instead believe that overtime the system has evolved into its current form.
Interest groups essentially represent the people, helping people find other like-minded individuals and collect and distribute information, among other things. Unfortunately these interest groups have become so dominant and numerous that an already slow government process is becoming slower. Rauch is completely correct when he argues that too many interest groups are a danger to democracy. Rauch argues that “the people” do no actively seek government benefits, but rather lobbies do.
Interest groups do indeed lead to a slower process of government, as the framers intended. However, with hyperpluralism the system becomes almost two slow, thus rendering the government ineffective. And thus, the problem we face. Interest groups are working and not working at the same time. Rauch proposes some solutions, including eliminating tax loopholes, subsidies, and programs that benefit lobbies. Interest groups, if allowed special benefits will continue to multiply and gain influence over the government, rendering it ineffective. If kept in check, interest groups can be beneficial and work to perpetuate government, not hinder it.
The framers of the constitution wanted a complex policy making system to slow down the legislative process. Interest groups can be considered a way of doing so, however, I do not believe it was what the framers had in mind. They specifically created other limitations when first forming the document to allow the system to be slowed. Also, I doubt that they could predict the degree in which interest groups have expanded and slowed down the process from so long ago. Rauch gives great examples as to how interest groups hurt the system but does not consider the advantages. Yet, even though interest groups may be an effective method of slowing down the legislative process, I do not think the framers had it in mind and I think it conflicts with other restrictions they already put in place.
this is korey by the way
When the constitution was framed, it was purposely made slow by the Framers. this is to make sure that any policy passed is truly thought over, and to help preserve minority rights. The interest group system is a danger to democracy, since it gives more sway to those who are a part of the interest group. But they do support the framers principles of minority rights. but there is a problem that I answered yes to both, because in my opinion having interest groups takes away from the basic idea of democracy, everyones EQUAL voice in policy
Rauch infers that interest groups hinder the democratic system. He sees interest groups as a hyperpluralist interference. And even though interest groups sometimes confuse and almost always complicate things, they are a necessary tool in the American government. In a democracy interest groups allow people to express their personal opinions, wants, and needs, the things people are truly passionate about. I believe that the framers wanted a complex system, and interest groups certainly add to the complexity of the process. Even though interest groups sometimes complicate and confuse the process of passing legislature and forming new policy, they are a necessary tool in American democracy.
Ruach complains that interest groups slow down the policy-making process. Is the interest-group system as portrayed by Rauch a danger to democracy? Is it in fact implementing the principles of the Framers that are implicit in the Constitution? And is there a problem if you have answer "yes" to both of these questions?
I don't think answering 'yes' to both questions produces a contradiction. Rauch does believe that interest group proliferation is dangerous to democracy, but keep in mind that America's government is not simply a democracy. Its democratic elements may be hindered by interest groups, but the government itself remains. The republican forms of the government are intrinsically tied to the democratic forms. I think that even though democracy seems threatened, it cannot be destroyed without destroying the entire system. And considering the fact that interest groups work within the system, it would take an enormous effort for the groups to overrun the government. Instead Rauch advocates the idea of letting the groups overrun themselves.
Rauch expresses concern for "a dominant key of political rhetoric today: standard populism—that is, someone has taken over the government and "we" must take it back, restore government to the people, etc." This "key of rhetoric" sounds quite empowering, but is essentially meaningless. Says Rauch: "The populist impulse to blame special interests, big corporations, and political careerists for our problems—once a tonic—has become Americans' leading political narcotic." A tonic is something that makes you feel better. A narcotic is addictive and dulls the senses. Rauch sees America as hyperpluralistic. The analogy suggests that before the rapid proliferation of interest groups, people blamed interest groups once in a while to make themselves feel better so they could move on. Now, however, the blaming has become a narcotic, keeping people from thinking for themselves, dulling their political perception, becoming the normal reaction.
Rauch points out a paradox of standard populism: one cannot seek to reform the political system without becoming involved with it. Special interests are not that special in the context of a hyperpluralistic society. They lose their significance among the thousands of other special interests. People support one cause in the name of fighting back against the evils of special interests. "Join and join, blame and blame", as Rauch describes the behavior. Whenever one of the "people" supports a cause, he becomes part of a special interest. Thus, "the people" can take no real action against the perceived tyranny of the special interests system.
"Even more depressing, any attempt to fight back against the proliferating mass of subdivision is foiled by the rhetoric of standard populism and its useful stooge: the special interest. The concept of a "special interest" is at the very core of standard populism—the "them" without which there can be no "us". Rauch's standard populism is mainly an empty emotional response, something that sounds triumphant and praiseworthy. People rant against "'special interests', those boils on the skin of democracy, forever interposing themselves between the American people and the people's servants in Washington"—but their ranting means nothing unless they actively become part of a special interest effort. It would seem that standard populism is itself an interest (i.e. interest in reforming the power system).
Ultimately, like Madison in the Federalist papers, Rauch advocates letting "the lobbying class" destroy itself by its own hyperpluralism. The only way to weaken it is to let it grind itself up in its own paradox.
Lathem thinks along some similar lines. "The struggle of groups to survive in the environments and to carry forward the aims and interests of the members, if entirely uninhibited, would produce violence and war"; he then goes on to explain that "social disapproval" of direct action in group struggles limits the struggles themselves to writing rules of tolerance and competition. Thus, the practical solution is still to let the lobbyists tangle themselves up in their own system.
So, according to Rauch and Madison, the best way to deal with hyperpluralism is to let it damage itself. The government produced by the Framers can withstand it: it was, after all, created to deal with factionalism and to limit the pitfalls of traditional democracy. So yes, interest groups can appear to hinder democracy; and yes, this is what the Founding Fathers wanted. Interest group proliferation is intrinsically bad for itself and will limit itself without its opponents accidentally feeding it in an attempt to suppress it.
Rauch portrays the current interest group system in America as being extremely hyperpluralist. He claims that the Interest group system has become so powerful that it slows down legislation. I agree that the interest groups and lobbyists in Washington directly contribute to a slower legislation process and slower policy implementation. I believe that Rauch is also correct in his belief that, "self-serving political careerists have hijacked government and learned to manipulate it for profit." This is sadly true, and the amount of politicians that choose to do it will increase as the amount of power that lobbyists and interest groups increase. I do not believe that the Founding Fathers intended for the Interest Groups and Lobbyists to be able to have such an impact on government official's policy. They intended for the people to be represented, and as of right now, the interest groups in America have become too big for their own britches.
There is a rather gargantuan misconception about the role of interest groups in American politics. We are under the impression that interst groups are changin government decisions on a regular basis but the truth is interest groups are nothing more than players in the elaborate game of government. If played correctly an effective interest group MAY draw attention to their respective points of view from Washington. This game is in many ways similar to Monopoly. It is exceedingly difficult to win and it won't likely happen in your lifetime (exageration folks relax). Yet an interest group's success is not nessecarily determined by a change in policy. Rather success is deteremined by the ability to inform the general voting populace who will in turn increase attention on the issue. Whether progress is obtained or not is a moot point but their purpose leans more towards encouraging slower action with many checkpoints along the way instead of a policy freeway.
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